Early Epidemiological Assessment of the Virulence of Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Case Study of an Influenza Pandemic by Nishiura, Hiroshi et al.
Early Epidemiological Assessment of the Virulence of
Emerging Infectious Diseases: A Case Study of an
Influenza Pandemic
Hiroshi Nishiura
1*, Don Klinkenberg
1, Mick Roberts
2, Johan A. P. Heesterbeek
1
1Theoretical Epidemiology, University of Utrecht, Utrecht, The Netherlands, 2Centre for Mathematical Biology, Institute of Information and Mathematical Sciences,
Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand
Abstract
Background: The case fatality ratio (CFR), the ratio of deaths from an infectious disease to the number of cases, provides an
assessment of virulence. Calculation of the ratio of the cumulative number of deaths to cases during the course of an
epidemic tends to result in a biased CFR. The present study develops a simple method to obtain an unbiased estimate of
confirmed CFR (cCFR), using only the confirmed cases as the denominator, at an early stage of epidemic, even when there
have been only a few deaths.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Our method adjusts the biased cCFR by a factor of underestimation which is informed by
the time from symptom onset to death. We first examine the approach by analyzing an outbreak of severe acute respiratory
syndrome in Hong Kong (2003) with known unbiased cCFR estimate, and then investigate published epidemiological
datasets of novel swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus infection in the USA and Canada (2009). Because observation of a
few deaths alone does not permit estimating the distribution of the time from onset to death, the uncertainty is addressed
by means of sensitivity analysis. The maximum likelihood estimate of the unbiased cCFR for influenza may lie in the range of
0.16–4.48% within the assumed parameter space for a factor of underestimation. The estimates for influenza suggest that
the virulence is comparable to the early estimate in Mexico. Even when there have been no deaths, our model permits
estimating a conservative upper bound of the cCFR.
Conclusions: Although one has to keep in mind that the cCFR for an entire population is vulnerable to its variations among
sub-populations and underdiagnosis, our method is useful for assessing virulence at the early stage of an epidemic and for
informing policy makers and the public.
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Introduction
When an emerging influenza virus appears in humans, an early
concern is whether the virus has the potential to cause a
devastating pandemic, i.e., the global spread of an infection killing
a substantial number of people. To assess the pandemic potential,
two critical aspects need to be studied: the transmission potential
and the clinical severity of the infection [1–3]. It is widely known
in epidemiology that the former aspect, the transmission potential,
can be quantified by the reproduction number, i.e., the average
number of secondary cases generated by a single primary case
[1,4], by characterizing the heterogeneous patterns of transmission
(e.g. age-specificity) [5], and by measuring other epidemiological
quantities such as household secondary attack rate. There are two
different approaches to assessing the latter aspect of a pandemic,
the virulence of infection. One is to explore specific genetic
markers of the virus that are known to be associated with severe
influenza (e.g. the PB1 gene) [6], although the absence of a known
marker, as was for example the case in a novel swine-origin
influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV), does not necessarily indicate
that the virus is benign [7]. Another is an epidemiological
approach to quantification of the case fatality ratio (CFR), the
conditional probability of death given infection (or disease; see
below).
The CFR in general is vaguely defined as the ratio of deaths to
cases, whose denominator should ideally be the total number of
infections, but is frequently taken to be only the diagnosed cases
due to the impossibility of counting all infected individuals.
Because in the early phase of an outbreak information is often
limited to confirmed cases, we concentrate on confirmed cases
only, and refer to the CFR as the confirmed CFR (cCFR) for
clarity. As the world has experienced a global spread of S-OIV
since April 2009, methods have been sought for the real-time
assessment of virulence by measuring the cCFR which is a
representative of the epidemiological measurements of virulence
[2,3]. Nevertheless, a much-used crude estimate of the cCFR, i.e.
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time t, tends to yield a biased (and mostly underestimated) cCFR
due to the time-delay from onset to death [8]; similar estimates of
such a biased cCFR for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
have shown how such estimates can vary substantially as an
epidemic progresses, stabilizing only in the later stages of the
outbreak [8,9]. In the following we will use the terms biased and
unbiased cCFR when we refer to this particular source of bias.
Improving an early epidemiological assessment of an unbiased
cCFR is therefore crucial for the initial determination of virulence,
shaping the level and choices of public health intervention, and
providing advice to the general public [10]. To obtain an estimate
of the cCFR, the lesson from the SARS outbreak is that a
statistical technique is required that corrects the underestimation,
e.g. a technique addressing censoring [8,11,12]. Nevertheless, in
the case of novel S-OIV, an early unbiased estimation of the cCFR
has appeared particularly challenging. Initial reports from the
government of Mexico suggested a virulent infection, whereas in
other countries the same virus was perceived as mild [13]. In the
USA and Canada there were no deaths attributed to the virus in
the first 10 days following a declaration of a public health
emergency by the World Health Organization. Even under similar
circumstances at the early stage of the global pandemic, public
health officials, policy makers and the general public want to know
the virulence of an emerging infectious agent. That is, a simple
method for assessing cCFR is called for, even when only a few
deaths have been reported, or even when there has been no report
of deaths. Except for another unbiased cCFR estimate in Mexico
(0.4%, range 0.3–1.5%) [1], this early assessment has been
missing. In the USA, a technical discussion has taken place on the
crude measurement of the biased cCFR using the cumulative
numbers of deaths and confirmed cases so far [10].
In line with this, an epidemiological method and its practical
guide for early assessment of virulence are called for. The present
study aims at developing a simple method to assess the virulence of
an emerging influenza virus at the early stage of the epidemic,
even when there have been only a few deaths or none at all. The
method takes into account the time from the onset of symptoms to
death, while differing from previously published statistical methods
which employ censoring techniques [8,11]. As an example, we give
an early prediction of the cCFR of S-OIV infection in the USA
and Canada, and show that the unbiased cCFR, as estimated by
our method at the early stage of the epidemic in these countries,
was in fact comparable to that estimated for Mexico [1]. Our
unbiased estimation of the cCFR does not address all sources of
error in data (e.g. underdiagnosis of infected individuals) and we
summarize the relevant issues in the discussion.
Materials and Methods
Theoretical background
We assess the virulence of S-OIV by measuring the risk of
death, expressed as the cCFR. The cCFR is interpreted as the
conditional probability of death given confirmed diagnosis [14].
Since the data of S-OIV infection we use in the present study are
only confirmed cases, we have replaced ‘‘infection’’ in the
denominator of CFR by confirmed diagnosis of infection (see
Discussion). Accordingly, an unbiased estimator of cCFR would be
the proportion of deaths among confirmed cases at the end of an
epidemic. Although one could instead assess the virulence by
measuring the proportion of hospitalized cases among a total
number of confirmed cases, criteria for hospital admission are not
universal, being influenced by isolation policies and in some
regions by cultural and social differences.
In the following, the notation used to represent the three
different statistical measurements of cCFR is: (i) bt, which is a
crude, biased estimate of the cCFR calculated at time t; (ii) p,
which is an unbiased cCFR to be estimated in the present study,
and is the unknown parameter that governed the outbreaks; and
(iii) pt, a random variable, which yields an estimator of p (see
below) and is regarded as the realized value in one particular
outbreak. First, bt, a crude and biased estimate of cCFR, calculated
at time t, is given by the ratio of the cumulative number of deaths
Dt to the cumulative number of confirmed cases Ct:
bt~
Dt
Ct:
ð1Þ
During the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
in 2002–03, it was shown that this estimator, bt, considerably
underestimates the cCFR [8]. This is easily demonstrated by
relating Ct and Dt to the incidence function ct (i.e. the number of
new confirmed cases on day t), and the conditional probability
density function fs of the time from onset to death, given death.
First, Ct is the cumulative number of confirmed cases up to time t:
Ct~
X t
i~0
ci: ð2Þ
Second, Dt is the cumulative number of deaths up to time t:
Dt~pt
X t
i~0
X ?
j~0
ci{jfj: ð3Þ
As we mentioned above, pt is the realized proportion of confirmed
cases to die from the infection, and is a random variable, which
would be an unbiased estimator for p. Therefore, bt can be
rewritten as
bt~pt
P t
i~0
P ?
j~0
ci{jfj
P t
i~0
ci
:
ð4Þ
As can be observed in equation (4), the estimator bt is smaller than
the realized pt, because the time delay from onset to death,
expressed in the double summation in the numerator, results in the
numerator being smaller than the denominator (note that fs is a
probability distribution). Therefore we refer to bt as the biased
estimator of the cCFR: it gives a biased estimate, calculated on day
t, of the cCFR [8,11]. When we observe the entire course of an
epidemic (i.e. tR‘), bt tends to pt and becomes an unbiased
estimator. The aim is to obtain an unbiased estimator ‘‘well
before’’ observing the entire course of the outbreak.
Statistical estimation
An adjustment of the estimator bt by a factor of underestimation
is achieved by rearranging equation (4):
pt~bt
P t
i~0
ci
P t
i~0
P ?
j~0
ci{jfj
:
ð5Þ
We use pt as the unbiased estimator of p, which is informed by
three pieces of information: the cumulative number of deaths Dt;
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death fs. The former two are observed during the course of an
epidemic. When there are a few deaths or none at all, an
assumption has to be made for fs, e.g. from literature based on
previous outbreaks (see below for detailed descriptions of fs). We
call the multiplicative factor in equation (4) the factor of
underestimation, ut, defined by
ut~
P t
i~0
P ?
j~0
ci{jfj
P t
i~0
ci
:
ð6Þ
The estimator pt can be written as pt=bt/ut.
Figure 1 depicts the concept of the sampling scheme. The
cumulative number of cases Ct is regarded as the total population
size. Of these, only a proportion ut has been at risk for dying by
time t, whereas the outcome for the remaining proportion 1 - ut is
still unobserved. Among the utCt cases that have been at risk, Dt
have died and utCt – Dt have survived the infection. This is a
sample from a binomial distribution with sample size utCt and
probability p:
Pr X~Dt ðÞ ~
utCt
Dt
  
pDt 1{p ðÞ
utCt{Dt: ð7Þ
An alternative way of deriving this probability is by first
considering the total number, y, of people in the sample Ct that
will ultimately die from infection, which is binomially distributed
with sample size n=Ct and probability p. However, because of the
time delay from onset to death, we do not observe this outcome by
time t: only for a proportion ut is the outcome observed. Hence our
observation is a hypergeometric sample from a population of size
Ct, with sample size utCt, and number of deaths y [15,16]:
Pr X~Dt ðÞ
~
X Ct{utCtzDt
y~Dt
Ct
y
 !
py 1{p ðÞ
Ct{y
y
Dt
 !
Ct{y
utCt{Dt
 !
Ct
utCt
 !
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
ð8Þ
which is equivalent to equation (7). We can use equation (7) as a
likelihood function to obtain the maximum likelihood estimate of
pt:
Lp t;Ct,Dt,ut ðÞ ~
utCt
Dt
  
pt
Dt 1{pt ðÞ
utCt{Dt: ð9Þ
The 95% confidence interval of pt is derived from the profile
likelihood. Further technical details, especially where an exponen-
tial growth of incidence is observed, are given in the Supporting
Information S1.
Quantitative illustrations
For calculation of the factor of underestimation ut, two pieces of
information are needed: the incidence function ct and the
distribution of time from onset to death fs. For ct, we use the
published dates of onset among confirmed cases, while fs is
assumed known.
We analyze empirical datasets of two different infectious
diseases: SARS in Hong Kong (2003) and S-OIV infection in
the USA and Canada (2009). First, we examine a simplified
version of our method by using only deaths and cases from an
early stage of the SARS epidemic, and compare our estimate
against the eventual stable estimate at the end of the epidemic. For
simplicity, we employ an exponential distribution for the
distribution of the time from onset to death, F(s), with a mean of
35.9 days [11], and fs is subsequently calculated as the daily
increase in F(s), i.e., fs=F(s)2F(s21). Second, we use the most
recent published datasets of S-OIV epidemics in which the dates of
illness onset for confirmed cases are known [17,18]. The latest
such reports for the USA and Canada were at May 1 and June 10,
2009, respectively. In the USA, there were 399 confirmed cases by
May 1, with 394 known dates of onset (Figure 2A). Among 399
confirmed cases, 2 cases resulted in death by May 1. In Canada,
there were 2978 confirmed cases, with 2004 known dates of onset
by June 10, among which 4 cases died by June 10 (Figure 2B). The
biased cCFR estimates, bt in these countries were 0.50% (=2/399)
and 0.13% (=4/2978), respectively. The six deaths are insufficient
to determine the distribution of time from onset to death for these
countries. We therefore employ a gamma distribution for F(s) (to
calculate fs), with reference to historical data for H1N1 [19], with a
mean length of 9 days and a variance of 39.7 days
2 (coefficient of
variation 70%, shape parameter 2.04) [20]. To address the
uncertainty, we examine the sensitivity of our unbiased cCFR
estimate to different means (6–14 days) and variances (9–159
days
2). See Supporting Information S2 for further technical details.
For the unbiased cCFR, we use 399 and 2978 cases,
respectively, as our Ct in equation (9) for the USA and Canada.
Figure 1. The population and sampling process for estimating
the unbiased confirmed case fatality ratio during the course of
an outbreak. At time t we know the cumulative number of confirmed
cases and deaths, Ct and Dt, and wish to estimate the unbiased case
fatality ratio p, by way of the factor of underestimation ut. If we knew ut
we could specify the size of the population no longer at risk (utCt,
shaded), although we do not know which surviving individuals belong to
this group. A proportion p of those in the group still at risk (size (1- ut)Ct,
unshaded) is expected to die. Because each case no longer at risk had an
independentprobabilityofdying,p,thenumberofdeaths,Dt,isasample
from a binomial distribution with n=utCt, and pt=p.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006852.g001
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adjustment of underestimation requires dates of symptom onset,
we use 394 and 2004 cases for computing ut. Although this has
little impact on the estimate for the USA, the cCFR in Canada is
likely to be underestimated by our estimator, because the majority
of the 974 cases whose dates of onset have yet to be clarified, may
have experienced their symptom onset close to the latest time
point of observation. We subsequently compare cCFR estimates
between the USA and Canada by means of Fisher’s exact test. For
the hypothesis testing, the number of deaths, Dt, as well as the
number of those survived, calculated as utCt2Dt, is compared
between two countries.
Results
SARS: the case of exponential growth phase
The factor of underestimation u during the exponential growth
phase is independent of time t and given by
u~M {r ðÞ ð 10Þ
where M(-r) is the moment generating-function of f(s), given the
exponential growth rate r which is estimated via a pure birth
process (see Supporting Information S3). That is, when f(s) is the
density of an exponential distribution with mean T, we have
u=M(2r)=1/(1+rT).
Figures 3A and 3B show the cumulative numbers of cases and
deaths of SARS, and Figure 3C the observed (biased) cCFR
estimates as a function of time, i.e. the ratio of the cumulative
number of cases to deaths at time t. Due to the delay from onset of
symptoms to death, the biased estimate of cCFR at time t
underestimates the realized cCFR at the end of an outbreak (i.e.
302/1755=17.2 %). Nevertheless, even by only using the observed
data for the period 19 March to 2 April, equation (10) yields an
appropriate prediction (Figure 3D), e.g. the unbiased cCFR at 27
Mar is 18.1% (95% CI: 10.5, 28.1). An overestimation is seen in the
very early stages of the epidemic, but the 95% confidence limits in
the later stages include the realized cCFR (i.e. 17.2 %).
Influenza (H1N1) in 2009: the case of a few deaths
When only a few deaths have been reported at the early stage of
an epidemic, the unbiased cCFR estimate is given by minimizing
the negative logarithm of the likelihood (see equation (9)). Given 2
and 4 deaths in the USA and Canada, respectively, and employing
a gamma-distributed time from onset-to-death, the unbiased
estimates of the cCFR are 1.23% (95% confidence interval (CI):
0.21, 3.76 %) and 0.18% (95% CI: 0.05, 0.41%) in the USA and
Canada, respectively. The estimate in the USA appears signifi-
cantly higher than that in Canada (Fisher’s exact test; p,0.01).
The uncertainty bounds on the unbiased cCFR estimates in both
countries overlap with that estimated for Mexico [1]. Sensitivity
analysis suggests that the expected values may lie in the range of
0.81–4.48% and 0.16–0.22% in the USA and Canada, respec-
tively (Figure 4).
Influenza (H1N1): the case of no death
Even when there has been no observation of death by time t,i t
would be useful for policy makers to understand the implication of
no deaths for interpreting virulence in a conservative way. When
Dt=0 equation (7) simplifies to:
Pr X~0 ðÞ ~ 1{p ðÞ
utCt ð11Þ
which would result in an unbiased cCFR estimate of 0. Because
sampling a finite number of cases during the course of an outbreak
cannot prove that infection never results in death, a more useful
result would be the maximum cCFR with a certain level of
confidence if no deaths are observed after Ct cases. To obtain this
result, we rearrange equation (11) to obtain
pmax~1{a
1
utCt ð12Þ
where pmax is the maximum cCFR given Ct cases and no deaths, at
a confidence level of 1-a, e.g. 95% if a=0.05. Equation (12) is
useful for obtaining a conservative estimate of virulence (i.e. upper
bound of possible cCFR estimates) when no deaths have been
reported by time t. In particular, during the early exponential
growth phase the factor of underestimation, u, is independent of t.
Assuming that the exponential growth phase of influenza
continued until April 21 and 24, 2009, respectively, in the USA
and Canada, r in these countries is estimated at 0.183 (95% CI:
0.133, 0.245) per day and 0.300 (95% CI: 0.241, 0.367) per day,
Figure 2. Temporal distribution of the date of onset for an H1N1 influenza epidemic in the USA and Canada, 2009. Epidemic curves of
confirmed cases of human infection with swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV) with known date of onset in (A) the USA (n=394) and (B)
Canada (n=2004). The vertical dashed line is the date on which the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention identified S-OIV. The World Health
Organization increased the pandemic alert level from 3 to 4 on April 27 (black arrow) and then to 5 on April 29 (gray arrow). It should be noted that
confirmed cases include substantial numbers of imported cases from abroad. In Canada, a few cases whose dates of onset were unable to be traced
are also included according to their dates when a specimen was collected (the exact number of such cases is not known). Assuming that their impact
on our estimation procedure is negligibly small, we regard all cases in B as representing the dates of onset.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006852.g002
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the USA and Canada (based on 42 and 91 cases and no deaths) is
shown in Figure 5. These upper bounds are examined for
confidence levels at 95% and 99%. If the mean and variance of the
time from onset to death are 9 days and 39.7 days
2, and we
employ a gamma distribution, pmax is estimated at 21.2% and
30.7% at a=0.05 and 0.01 in the USA. Similarly, pmax in Canada
is estimated at 16.8% and 24.6% at a=0.05 and 0.01,
respectively.
Discussion
We propose a new epidemiological method for assessing the
virulence of an emerging infectious disease at the early stage of an
epidemic. The results with the Hong Kong SARS dataset prove
the usefulness of this method that corrects the biased cCFR
estimator which is simply the ratio of cumulative deaths to cases.
Early in the epidemic, the ultimately realized cCFR is within the
confidence interval obtained by our method. The proposed
method is particularly useful when an epidemic curve of confirmed
cases is the only data available (i.e. when individual data from
onset to death are not available, especially, during the early stage
of the epidemic).
Our estimates suggest that the virulence of S-OIV H1N1
infection is comparable to the virulence observed in past influenza
pandemics of the 20th century (,2.0 % for the 1918–19 pandemic
and,0.5 % for the 1957–58 pandemic [21]). Although our
estimates may not be as high as 2.0%, and even though the
unbiased cCFR estimate for the USA is a likely overestimation (see
below), we should emphasize that antiviral treatment and other
medical interventions have been instituted from the beginning of
this pandemic. Our results show that the few observations of death
in the USA and Canada give us no reason to believe that the
unbiased cCFR, and therefore the virulence of the novel pandemic
strain, is smaller in the USA and Canada than in Mexico.
Nevertheless, given that the CFR of seasonal influenza is equal to
or less than 0.1% [10], our estimates (with the lower bound of
cCFR close to the 0.1%) do not offer conclusive results to indicate
that the S-OIV is more virulent than seasonal influenza, but do
point in that direction.
It should be noted that our method only adjusts underestimation
due to time delay from onset to death, and other epidemiological
characteristics associated with unbiased estimation of the cCFR
have yet to be addressed. In the present study, we estimated the
cCFR as the proportion of deaths among confirmed cases. This
definition was chosen, because of our aim to use the minimally
available data, and so we were not able to estimate the proportion
of deaths among all symptomatic cases, and not able to estimate
the proportion of deaths among all those infected (symptomatic
and asymptomatic). The issue of defining the correct denominator
population can never be completely resolved, but it is essential to
realize how the obtained estimate relates to other situations [8]. By
only using confirmed cases, it is clear that all cases will be missed
that do not seek medical treatment or are not notified, as well as all
cases that are asymptomatic. This means that our cCFR estimate
is higher than the proportion of deaths among infecteds, and may
be considered an overestimate. However, when relating our
estimate to previous pandemics, it should also be realized that the
current pandemic is the first where many confirmatory diagnoses
of influenza have been recorded using RT-PCR techniques,
allowing improved precision of cCFR estimates over those for
previous influenza epidemics. Whereas the use of RT-PCR in the
current pandemic may yield a smaller denominator (and thus an
overestimate of CFR compared to previous pandemics), other
pandemics could have involved substantial numbers of false-
positive cases in the denominator. Developing a method which
permits comparable assessment of virulence is ongoing.
Figure 3. Early determination of the unbiased confirmed case
fatality ratio of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in
Hong Kong, 2003. (A & B) Cumulative numbers of confirmed cases
and deaths. The increase in death is delayed in observation because of
the time delay from onset to death. (C) Observed biased confirmed case
fatality ratio (cCFR) estimates as a function of time (thick line) calculated
as the ratio of the cumulative number of confirmed cases to deaths at
time t. The estimate at the end of an outbreak (i.e. 302/1755=17.2 %) is
the realized cCFR by the end of the epidemic. The horizontal
continuous line and dotted lines show the expected value and the
95% confidence intervals of the predicted unbiased cCFR estimate
(based on our method) only by using the observed data until 27 Mar
2003 (estimated at 18.1 % (95% CI: 10.5, 28.1). The 95% confidence
interval was derived from profile likelihood. (D) The comparisons
between the realized cCFR (horizontal grey line), the unbiased cCFRs
based on observations by calendar time t, and the biased cCFR
estimates, bt, given by the ratio of deaths to cases. Each prediction was
obtained by using the exponential growth rate r up to time t and the
cumulative numbers of deaths and cases at time t, and the mean time
from onset-to-death of 35.9 days [11] which is assumed to follow an
exponential distribution. Overestimation is seen in the early stages of
the epidemic, but the 95% confidence limits in the later stages include
the realized cCFR.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006852.g003
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USA and Canada based on the reporting date of confirmed cases
and deaths to the World Health Organization. Note that the
estimates in Figure 6C are different from our bt due to
unavailability of the date of onset, although they give an
approximate indication of the time-course of the biased cCFR.
It is striking to see that the biased cCFR during the very early stage
(i.e. from late April to mid-May) showed a declining trend
following a single spike. The biased cCFR estimates at later time
points show a slight increase as a function of time, which is
consistent with our knowledge of underestimation of the cCFR [8].
The early spike may be explained by a time-varying coverage of
confirmed diagnoses which could have increased as a function of
time (i.e. cases in the very beginning of the epidemic were less
likely to be confirmed). Other plausible explanations include (1)
demographic stochasticity, (2) effective treatment, and (3) hetero-
geneous risk of death among subpopulations. As for (1), because
the number of deaths in the USA and Canada was very small
during the early stage, the spike may reflect (unpredictable)
probabilistic variations in the number of deaths among a small
number of confirmed cases. If that is the case, our unbiased cCFR
estimate for the USA (with data until May 1) may be too high, not
because of a systematic bias but just by chance. In relation to
factor (2), it is plausible that cases diagnosed in later stages of the
epidemic receive treatment at an early stage of illness (or even
before symptom onset). With respect to (3), the risk of dying is
likely to be different for different subpopulations [8,10,22,23]. It
should be noted that the composition of sub-populations (e.g. age-
groups and those with a specific underlying disease) is likely to vary
as a function of time, and a cCFR estimate for the entire
population, such as ours, is influenced by this variation. These
points need to be addressed in future studies.
To fully clarify the virulence and its epidemiological character-
istics (e.g. variable risks by age and underlying diseases), two
Figure 4. Sensitivity of the unbiased confirmed case fatality ratio of an influenza virus (H1N1) infection to different means and
coefficients of variation of the time from onset to death in the USA and Canada, 2009. The contours show the maximum likelihood
estimate of the unbiased confirmed case fatality ratio as a function of the mean and coefficient of variation of the time from onset-to-death in (A) the
USA and (B) Canada. The estimates are based on observation by May 1 and June 10, respectively, with 2 and 4 deaths among a total of 399 and 2978
confirmed cases, respectively. A gamma distribution is employed for the time from onset to death, f(s). Both the quantitative and qualitative patterns
of the USA differ from those of Canada, because the epidemic curve in the USA include more cases who developed the disease recently than those in
Canada. It should be noted that the contour gray scales are different in (A) and (B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006852.g004
Figure 5. Upper bound of the confirmed case fatality ratio when there is no report of death. Upper bound of the cCFR (confirmed case
fatality ratio) estimates in (A) the USA and (B) Canada, given no deaths by April 21 and April 24, 2009, respectively (based on 42 and 91 cases). The
upper bounds are examined for significance levels at 95% and 99% to find at least 1 death. Gamma and exponential distributions were employed to
model the distribution of time from onset to death.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006852.g005
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rather than updating the data based on date of reporting, it is
critically important to summarize the data according to the date of
onset both at local and global levels. Knowing the date of
symptom onset is a key to applying our proposed estimation
framework to empirical observation. Second, epidemiological data
should be updated in a precise reporting interval at least during
the early stage of an epidemic (so that the data permit estimation
of the unbiased cCFR). Given that mean time from onset to death
is around 9 days, weekly data do not enable us to make our explicit
adjustment. Optimal reporting for the early cCFR estimation may
be incorporated into official pandemic response plans. Moreover,
in addition to using death as an outcome of virulence, the
usefulness of other epidemiological measurements of severe
manifestation (e.g. the number of admissions to intensive care
unit) needs to be explored.
Despite a need to further clarify heterogeneous risks of death for
the S-OIV pandemic, early assessment of virulence by means of our
unbiased cCFR estimator is useful for informing policy makers and
the general public about the potential severity of an infectious
disease (of course, one needs to ensure an understanding of the
above mentioned bias among non-experts). We have shown that
underestimation can be adjusted in a very simple manner, and our
approach enabled us to obtain an unbiased cCFR estimate by only
minimizing a binomial deviance. These methods are particularly
useful when there have been only a few deaths or even no death at
all by time t during the course of an epidemic. Uncertainties
surrounding the unbiased estimate of cCFR based on a few deaths
can partly be addressed by sensitivity analysis of the estimate to
different lengths of time from onset to death. An observation of zero
deathsina given country(oraspecific setting) shouldnot be deemed
a signature of a ‘‘benign’’ virus without observing a substantial
number of cases. We have shown that a conservative upper bound
of cCFR is a more useful interpretation of the observed number of
cases without death. In this way, given that we have some prior
knowledgeora few observations ofdeath which permit us to assume
F(s) is known, epidemiologists and biostatisticians in each country or
locality can directly apply our method to assess the virulence of an
infection at the early stage of any emerging infectious disease.
During the final stages of revision, it came to our attention that
an epidemiological study on cCFR of S-OIV with similar
techniques and statistical philosophy has been published online
[24], indicating that the preliminary estimate of cCFR for a
combination of the USA, Canada and Mexico is 0.5% and
emphasizing a need to accurately capture the cases for the
denominator.
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